文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：投贷联动连续融资过程中协议谈判的博弈分析

英文题名：Game Analysis of Provision Negotiation in the Process of Investment-loan Linkage Continuous Financing

作者：王慧[1];冯元卿[1]

第一作者：王慧

机构：[1]北京联合大学商务学院,北京100025

第一机构：北京联合大学商务学院

年份：2020

期号：6

起止页码：19-29

中文期刊名：经济问题

外文期刊名：On Economic Problems

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2019_2020】；

基金：北京市哲学社会科学基金项目"北京市科技金融网络协同对企业创新绩效影响机制的研究"(16YJC045)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：投贷联动;协议谈判;博弈论;连续融资;利益分配

外文关键词：investment and loan linkage;provision negotiation;game theory;continuous financing;benefit distribution

摘要：在"大众创新,万众创业"的号召下,以银行和风险投资机构为主体的扶持中小微企业创新发展的投贷联动进入了大众视野,如何在投贷联动下制定有利于多方的合作协议是目前亟须解决的关键问题。以投贷联动连续融资过程中的协议为研究对象,分别研究只存在单一投资者联盟和存在其他外部投资机构介入两种情况下的投贷联动连续融资的谈判过程。对于只存在单一投资者联盟的情况,运用博弈论分析投贷联动不断地连续融资的过程中银行与风险投资机构之间的协议谈判,解析双方利益分配的博弈进程和影响其利益分配条款的影响因素;对于存在其他外部投资机构介入的情况,运用讨价还价博弈论模型解析企业与先后投资者之间的多方博弈,就多种情况进行综合讨论,并就影响企业收益回报的对赌值和付出努力程度进行相关性分析。期望通过对投贷联动连续融资过程中的博弈进行准确的刻画与分析,从而能够为制定有利于多方合作的投贷联动协议提供建议。
With the raise of"Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation", institutions like banks and venture capital firms, which are the main institutions to support the innovation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises have attracted public’s vision. How to make a good cooperation in provisions which benefit multiple parties’ interests under the investment-loan linkage is the key problem that needs to be solved urgently at present.The provisions in agreement in the process of continuous investment-loan financing is the main object in this paper, which have been classified to two conditions: there is only one single investor alliance and there are other external investment institutions involved. In the condition of only one single investor alliance, game theory is applied to analyze the provision negotiation between banks and venture capital firms in the process of continuous financing of investment and loan linkage, and the process of interest distribution with influencing factors of both parties;in the condition of external investments involved, bargaining game theory is used to find how enterprises carry out bargaining results between the enterprises and successive investors, which would be comprehensively discussed under various situations, after that the correlation between the gambling value and the degree of effort that affect the return of the enterprise is going to be analyzed. In this paper, through the accurate description and analysis of the game in the process of continuous financing, suggestions are provided to reinforce multi-party cooperation.