文献类型：会议论文

英文题名：Analysis on the Tactics and Benefit of Vertical Cooperative R&D Innovation in Supply Chain

作者：Sheng, Xiaojuan[1];Wang, Zhe[2];Xue, Wanxin[1]

第一作者：盛晓娟

通讯作者：Sheng, XJ[1]

机构：[1]Beijing Union Univ, Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China;[2]Univ Sci & Technol Beijing, Dongling Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

第一机构：北京联合大学管理学院

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Beijing Union Univ, Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China.|[1141755]北京联合大学管理学院;[11417]北京联合大学;

会议论文集：International Conference on Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences (LISS)

会议日期：JUL 27-29, 2015

会议地点：Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Int Ctr Informat Res, Barcelona, SPAIN

主办单位：Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Int Ctr Informat Res

语种：英文

外文关键词：Game Theory; Vertical Cooperation; Complete Monopoly; Supply Chain; Cooperative Innovation

摘要：Vertical cooperative innovation during supply chain may overcome the high investment in R&D and uncertainty, and it also can avoid risks, shorten product development cycles. In this paper, a vertical cooperative R&D model is built in the upstream monopoly supply chain based on game theory. The following conclusions is drawn: Monopoly in the upstream vertical cooperative R&D model, with the absorptive capacity of enterprises and the overflow level of the increase in corporate R&D results, the upstream and downstream businesses will increase profits. The upstream monopoly enterprise cannot force the downstream companies to join the cooperative R&D alliance, and undertake research and development costs too much. To maximize profits, the upstream companies can only travel companies in the following bound for the standard to determine the number of member companies and the downstream cost-sharing ratio.