文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：公共景区的产权残缺及其经济分析

英文题名：Incomplete Property Right on Chinese Public Scenic Spots and Related Economic Analysis

作者：庞世明[1];王恒[1];刘敏[1];孙业红[1]

第一作者：庞世明

机构：[1]北京联合大学旅游学院

第一机构：北京联合大学旅游学院

年份：2013

卷号：28

期号：6

起止页码：87-93

中文期刊名：旅游学刊

外文期刊名：Tourism Tribune

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2012_2013】；

基金：国家自然科学基金(40901069);国家自然科学基金青年项目(41201580);北京市自然科学基金(8123042);北京联合大学新起点计划项目(sk201212);北京联合大学人才强校计划人才资助项目资助~~

语种：中文

中文关键词：公共景区;产权残缺;经济效率;经济行为

外文关键词：public scenic sports; truncated of property right; economic efficiency; economic behavior

摘要：现代经济学已经认识到产权制度对经济效率和经济行为的影响作用。文章重点关注旅游资源以全民所有和集体所有为依托的景区的产权性质,在分析公共景区的产权基础后,提出目前中国公共景区的产权残缺,并进一步讨论这种产权残缺下的经济效率和经济影响。主要研究结论为:公共景区收益权和控制权的集中带来了经济效率的提升,但由于地方政府并非公共景区的实际所有者,因此在追求公共景区租值最大化的同时,可以不考虑全民和集体"委托人"的利益,有着为短期利益可以放弃长期收益的激励,这可以进一步解释公共景区开发过程中的各种现象。在此基础上,文章对未来的研究进行了展望。
This research focuses on the property right of scenic spots which are owned by ＂all-people＂ or by the collective, namely ＂public scenic spots＂. In China, world heritage sites, national parks, geological parks, cultural relics and resorts all belong to this category. In the operation of these scenic spots, two opposite views have been proposed which are the ＂National Park＂ approach and the ＂property-right transfer＂ approach. Some people argue that public scenic spots in China should be operated by the ＂National Park＂ approach, while others believe that a private company should he contracted to lead the management and operation of these sites. It seems obvious that the debate is still going on since the property rights of such scenic spots have already been claimed unambiguously a long time ago. This research finds that the property right which is soundly declared to belong to ＂all people＂ in fact is ambiguous. In some cases, it may be said to be ＂owner-free＂. In order to further explain the behavior of the operators of scenic spots, it is necessary to analyze the actual property right status of the public scenic spots. Property rights play a crucial role in an economy. Many studies have been done by Coase （1937,1960） , Alchian （ 1965,1993）, Demsetz （ 1967 ）, Barzel （ 1989 ）, and Cheung （ 1969,1970,1974 ）. All Private owners have strong incentives to use their property right in the most valuable way. Based on private property right, the two sides in a transaction can choose a contract to avoid risk, reduce costs and improve efficiency. In fact, the rent of a resource will dissipate without private property right. Private property right is a comprehensive structure that contains a variety of right elements. If a portion in a bundle of property rights is prohibited, the rent will certainly dissipate to some degree, which is named the first type of incomplete property rights. When an owner voluntarily yields his part or all of the control powers in exchange for benefits, while portions of a property rights bundle are designated to different subjects due to regulation, the second type of incomplete property rights appears. Incomplete property rights lead to less efficient allocation of resources. Based on the condition of acknowledging personal property rights, any collective could be traced to the individual in the collective and the individual would be responsible for his way of administration. Nevertheless, the legislative system in China claims all public scenic spots to be owned by all-people or groups of people, but not any specific individual person. This means nobody will take the responsibility for running the scenic spot. Hence, ＂The public＂ under this context cannot be attributed to be any specific personnel. Transfer of public scenic spots＇ property rights should start from the public institutions. In China, disposed rights of public scenic spots belong to the local government, while profits come to the central government. This setting fails to motivate local governments to maximize profits and thereof results in low efficiency. When the economic reforms began, the division of profits between central and local governments were established, and after 1993, local governments became the leading authority in running public scenic spots. However, after the merge of income rights and disposed rights, local governments can maximize their own interests without considering all-people or groups of people. Local authorities may abandon long-term interests for short-term advantages without a precise ownership endowment. This study focuses on incomplete property rights in Chinese public scenic spots, analyzes its historical origin and present status and explains the consequences in running public scenic spots in China. A more thorough theoretical framework needs to be built to give a full picture of this phenomenon by further deep research in the field, taking some methodology from anthropology and sociology. This should be discussed in future research.