文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Government regulation strategy, leading firms' innovation strategy, and following firms imitation strategy: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory

作者：Zhang, Mengke[1];Huang, Yan[1];Jin, Yifan[1];Bao, Yuan[1]

第一作者：Zhang, Mengke

通讯作者：Huang, Y[1]

机构：[1]Beijing Union Univ, Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

第一机构：北京联合大学管理学院

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Beijing Union Univ, Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China.|[1141755]北京联合大学管理学院;[11417]北京联合大学;

年份：2023

卷号：18

期号：6

外文期刊名：PLOS ONE

收录：;Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85161956619);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001004729200035)】；

基金：This study was funded by a grant from the Beijing Social Science Foundation of China [No 22GLB029], and the National Social Science Foundation of China [No 21BGL237]. The funders had norole in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

语种：英文

摘要：In the innovation ecosystem, the knowledge-based game behavior of each subject not only pertains to its own survival and development but also affects evolution of the innovation ecosystem. The present study investigates the choice of government's regulation strategy, leading firms' innovation protection strategy and following firms' imitation strategy from the perspective of group evolutionary game. Based on the cost-benefit perspective, an asymmetric tripartite evolutionary game model and a simulation model are constructed to analyze the strategies and stability of the evolutionary equilibrium of each subject. We focus mainly on the protection intensity of innovation achievements by leading enterprises and the difficulty of imitation and substitution by following enterprises. The cost of patent operation and maintenance, government subsidies, and the relative difficulty of technology substitution and imitation were identified as the key factors affecting the evolutionary equilibrium of the system. Based on different scenarios resulting from the aforementioned factors, four equilibrium states are observed in the system, namely {no government regulation, technology secrecy, substitution}, {no government regulation, technology secrecy, imitation}, {no government regulation, patent application, imitation}, and {government regulation, patent application, imitation}. Finally, the study suggests corresponding recommendations for the three parties, which can help governments as well as the leading and following firms to choose appropriate behavioral strategies. At the same time, this study offers positive insights to participants in the global innovation ecosystem.