文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Research on the Pollutant Emission Reduction Strategy and Simulation of Paper-Making Enterprises under the Reward and Punishment Mechanism

作者：Zhang, Sen[1];Qin, Guangyuan[1];Xie, Yifan[1];Tian, Yuan[2];Shi, Liyuan[2];Cheng, Baodong[1]

第一作者：Zhang, Sen

通讯作者：Qin, GY[1]

机构：[1]Beijing Forestry Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China;[2]Beijing Union Univ, Business Coll, Beijing 100025, Peoples R China

第一机构：Beijing Forestry Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Beijing Forestry Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China.

年份：2021

卷号：2021

外文期刊名：DISCRETE DYNAMICS IN NATURE AND SOCIETY

收录：;Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85117514172);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000708265700002)】；

基金：The authors thank the National Natural Science Foundation of China for supporting this research. This research was funded by National Natural Science Foundation Youth Project, grant number 71804013.

语种：英文

摘要：Environmental pollution has become an important obstacle on the path of ecological civilization construction, and it is urgent to control environmental pollution. By establishing an evolutionary game model, this thesis focuses on analyzing how paper-making enterprises choose their own emission reduction strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. It further analyzes how social welfare changes under the reward and punishment mechanism, and finally through simulation research, this thesis analyzes the evolutionary paths of paper-making enterprises' pollution emission strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. The results of the reward and punishment mechanism are as follows: under the static reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will repeatedly oscillate around a point. There is no stable equilibrium point at this time. However, under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will tend to a stable equilibrium point. The results of social welfare analysis show that high-intensity rewards will reduce the amount of pollution discharged by paper-making enterprises, thereby maximizing social welfare. On the contrary, when paper-making enterprises discharge a large amount of pollution, they will be subject to high-intensity penalties. When facing high-intensity punishments, paper-making enterprises will tend to not to discharge. So social welfare is also maximized. The simulation research results show that reasonable punishment strategies are more effective than reward ones. Based on this, the author proposes countermeasures, such as establishing a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, reasonably determining the reward and punishment intensity for polluting enterprises. The emission reduction strategies of paper-making enterprises will be affected by the government's reward and punishment mechanism. A deep study of its internal mechanism is not only of great significance for pollution control but also of great significance for the development of a green economy.