文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Evolutionary Game Research between the Government Environmental Regulation Intensities and the Pollution Emissions of Papermaking Enterprises

作者：Zhang, Sen[1];Qin, Guangyuan[1];Wang, Ling[2];Cheng, Baodong[1];Tian, Yuan[2]

第一作者：Zhang, Sen

通讯作者：Qin, GY[1]

机构：[1]Beijing Forestry Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China;[2]Beijing Union Univ, Business Coll, Beijing 100025, Peoples R China

第一机构：Beijing Forestry Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Beijing Forestry Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China.

年份：2021

卷号：2021

外文期刊名：DISCRETE DYNAMICS IN NATURE AND SOCIETY

收录：;Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85115735015);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000697292600001)】；

基金：The authors thank the National Natural Science Foundation of China for supporting this research. *is research was funded by National Natural Science Foundation Youth Project, grant number 71804013.

语种：英文

摘要：Environmental regulations of different intensities may have different impacts on polluting enterprises. The purpose of this article is to analyze how different environmental regulations affect the pollution discharge strategies of papermaking enterprises. By establishing an evolutionary game model between the government environmental regulation intensities and the pollutant emissions from papermaking enterprises, this thesis further solves the model and performs stability analysis and finally uses MATLAB to conduct simulation studies. And the researching results show that papermaking enterprises will take risks to choose the illegal pollutant discharge strategies when the illegal profits are large. Further analysis shows that the increase in the successful probability of the strong environmental regulations does not necessarily force papermaking enterprises to choose to comply with pollution discharge regulations. However, papermaking enterprises may choose to comply with discharge pollution regulations not only by increasing the successful probability of strong environmental regulations but also by increasing the rewards and punishments for papermaking enterprises as well as by increasing the probability of reporting violations of pollutants. Based on the above results, the author proposes several countermeasures, such as establishing a specialized pollution monitoring agency, encouraging third-party supervision, reporting pollution behaviors, and increasing penalties for polluting companies for violations. China is in a critical period of transition from rapid development to high-quality development. It will provide some reliable references for the construction of a green economy and an ecological economy that the characteristics and relationships between the intensity of government environmental regulations and corporate pollution emissions revealed in this article.