文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Financial Security Analysis of E-Commerce Platform Based on Supply Chain for Heterogeneous Network Location Verification

作者：Qu, Qiao[1];Liu, Cheng[1];Bao, Xinzhong[2]

第一作者：Qu, Qiao

通讯作者：Qu, Q[1]

机构：[1]Univ Sci & Technol Beijing, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China;[2]Beijing Union Univ, Sch Management, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China

第一机构：Univ Sci & Technol Beijing, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Univ Sci & Technol Beijing, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China.

年份：2021

卷号：2021

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF SENSORS

收录：;EI(收录号：20220211442036);Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85122337852);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000771282600006)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000771282600006)】；

语种：英文

外文关键词：Costs - Decision making - Decision theory - Game theory - Heterogeneous networks - Internet service providers - Supply chains

摘要：The development of supply chain finance, its pricing strategy for bilateral business cooperation between e-commerce, banking institutions, and fourth-party logistics services providers has gained the attention of researchers. This paper combines the heterogeneous network location verification technology, starting from information asymmetry and Rubens bargaining game ideas, and combines it with game theory methods to provide a reference for bilateral cooperation decision-making on e-commerce platforms. The experiment results indicated the pricing decisions of e-commerce platforms which are affected by the efforts of the other party and the ability of bargaining. The quoted price increases with the decrease of the bank's ability and the increase of the service provider's ability. The pricing decisions of banks and service providers are only affected by the direct proportion of their respective business costs. When considering the introduction of incentive mechanism conditions, it is found that appropriate incentive conditions can increase the quotation of the e-commerce platform. The price quoted by the e-commerce platform that chooses to bargain with the bank is higher than the price quoted by the bank after negotiating with the service provider, which will help to better realize the benefits. Finally, the paper numerically analyzes the results of the bargaining game between e-commerce platforms and banks and fourth-party logistics service providers, and the numerical results verify the better performance.